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In a di¤erentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that rmsowners use
to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, prots and social welfare.
If products are either su¢ ciently di¤erentiated or su¢ ciently close substitutes, owners use
Relative Performance contracts. For intermediate levels of product substitutability, they
use Market Share contracts. When owners do not commit over the types of contracts, each
type is an owners best response to his rivals choice. Product substitutability has di¤er-
ential e¤ects on output levels and pro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consumerssurplus.
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1 Introduction
It is well established that in modern rms, where ownership and management are separated
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), one of the key aspects of corporate governance relates to managerial
compensation (van Witteloostuijn et al., 2007). In this context, countries with relatively ma-
ture corporate governance codes (United States, United Kingdom and Japan, as ranked in La
Porta et al., 1999) o¤er ample of evidence regarding the alternative structures of compensation
contracts that owners use so as to motivate their managers to gain a competitive advantage in
the market (Murphy, 1999; Jensen et al., 2004).
The strategic use of managerial incentive contracts has been introduced by Vickers (1985),
Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). In these papers, each
owner has the opportunity to compensate his manager with an incentive contract combining
own prots and sales or revenues, in order to direct him to a more aggressive behavior in the
market. Early empirical studies (Baker et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lambert et
al., 1991) suggest that CEO compensation is positively associated with both prot and sales.
Industry level analyses suggest that contracts of this type are widely adopted in the CEO
compensation practice in US new economyrms (Nourayi and Daroca, 2008), the US electric
(Duru and Iyengar, 1999) and the US gas (Agrawal et al., 1991) utility industries. There is also
evidence according to which, top executivescompensation is based on relative performance
(Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Barro and Barro, 1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992). Motivated
by this evidence, Miller and Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005) formalize the relative performance
contracts, where a managers compensation is a linear combination of own prots and the
relative performance against the rivalsprots. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Joh (1999)
nd that this contract type is widely adopted in the US and Japanese manufacturing sector
respectively. Regarding the UK, Keasy (2008) suggests that relative shareholder return growth
remains the most popular performance measure linked with executive compensation. Another
series of evidence suggests that CEO compensation is linked with own market share (Peck,
1988; Borkowski, 1999). Ritz (2008), who, along with Jansen et al. (2007) formalize contracts
combining own prots and own market share, stresses that this type of contract is the dominant
in the US automotive and investment banking industries.
Academics, practicioners and policy makers, so far, seem to seek for an explanation re-
garding the emergence of the alternative structures of managerial compensation contracts.
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Our paper contributes to the relevant literature by investigating the impact of product substi-
tutability on the types of contracts that rmsowners choose to compensate their managers,
as well as on the resulting output levels, prots and social welfare.
In particular, the present paper addresses the following four questions. First, what is the
e¤ect of product substitutability, and the respective competitiveness in the nal good market,
on the output levels set by managers and the resulting rmsprots? Second, how does the
degree of product substitutability a¤ect the types of contracts that rmsowners choose to
compensate their managers? Our third question has been motivated by a key assumption of
the relevant literature: Firmsowners commit over the types of contracts that they choose to
compensate their managers. Then, we ask whether the results obtained with ex-ante commit-
ment still hold without commitment. The fourth question is relevant to the societal e¤ects of
the di¤erent managerial incentive contracts.
To address the above questions, we build upon Jansen et al. (2009) framework, with one
important departure. We assume that the two competing rms produce di¤erentiated instead of
homogeneous products. In this environment, we consider a three-staged game with observable
actions: In stage one, each rms owner commits to one type of contract to compensate his
manager. This contract can be a linear combination of own prots and either own revenues
(Prots-Revenues contract), or competitors prots (Relative Performance contract) or, nally,
own market share (Market Share contract). In the second stage of the game, given that the
types of contracts have become common knowledge and can not be reset, each owner sets
the weight (managerial incentive parameter) between own prots and either own revenues, or
competitors prots, or own market share. At the nal stage, managers compete in quantities.
We argue that the e¤ect of product substitutability on the output levels set by managers
and the resulting rms prots depends crucially on the conguration of contracts. When
both managers are compensated either with Prots-Revenues or with Relative Performance
contracts, output and prots decrease as products become closer substitutes. The reason is that
as products become closer substitutes, the market segment that each rm exploits decreases.
Hence, the output level that each manager sets and the resulting prots also decrease. On the
contrary, when both managers are compensated with Market Share contracts, it is the positive
competition e¤ect that dominates, according to which, as products become closer substitutes
and competition for market share among managers becomes ercer, each manager tends to
increase output. This tends to increase prots too. Regarding the asymmetric congurations,
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where managers are compensated with contracts of di¤erent types, product substitutability
has di¤erential e¤ects on output levels and prots. In particular, the output level set by the
manager who is compensated with the advantageous contract, in terms of output expansion
and prots, has a U-shaped relation in the degree of product substitutability. Intuitively, as
products become closer substitutes, this manager increases the output level in order to exploit
the competitive advantage that his contract gives him. On the contrary, the output level set
by the rival manager decreases as products become closer substitutes. Firms prots follow the
same pattern as the output level in each case.
As far as the second question is concerned, we show that the types of contracts that owners
choose to compensate their managers depend crucially on the degree of product substitutability.
In particular, when products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, owners compensate their managers
with Relative Performance contracts. Intuitively, Relative Performance contracts result in a
relatively more severe overproduction situation, as compared with the respective of Market
Share contracts. This overproduction situation has two e¤ects on prots. On the one hand
it tends to increase prots but on the other hand, it tends to decrease them through price
decrease. Our analysis suggests that the overproductions positive e¤ect on prots is stronger
under Relative Performance contracts, rather than the respective under Market Share con-
tracts. Hence, owners compensate their managers with Relative Performance contracts. For
intermediate levels of product substitutability, owners choose to compensate their managers
with Market Share contracts. This is so because the overproduction situation, characterized
by relatively higher output and lower prots, under Market Share contracts is less severe than
the respective under Relative Performance contracts. This reasoning is reversed if products are
su¢ ciently close substitutes, in which case owners compensate their managers with Relative
Performance contracts. Our ndings further suggest that given an owners choice, over the
type of contract to compensate his manager, his rivals best response is a contract of the same
type.
Then, we examine the case where there is no ex-ante commitment over the types of contracts
that owners choose to compensate their managers. In this environment, the following two-
staged game is studied: in the rst stage, each rms owner chooses the type of contract and
sets the corresponding managerial incentive parameter. In the second stage, managers compete
in quantities. We nd that each type of contract can be an owners best response to the rival
owners choice. The intuitive explanation behind this nding is based on the conditions that
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must be fullled in equilibrium: rstly, since production decisions are taken by managers, in
equilibrium, their reaction curves must be intersected. Secondly, the fact that a rms owner
o¤ers an incentive contract to his manager, as a strategic tool in order to become Stackelberg
leader against the rival rm, implies that in equilibrium, there must be tangency between this
rms isoprot curve and the rival rm managers reaction curve.
Regarding the fourth question, we nd that the symmetric use of contracts by rmsowners
is socially benecial, compared to the No-delegation benchmark, except if owners compensate
their managers with Market Share contracts and products are su¢ ciently close substitutes.
Under the asymmetric congurations of contracts, social welfare lies between the respective
levels in the symmetric ones. Moreover, social welfare decreases as products become closer
substitutes.
The literature that compares the market and societal outcomes of di¤erent managerial in-
centive contracts has restricted attention on perfect substitute goods (van Witteloostuijn et al.,
2007; Jansen et al., 2009). The present paper contributes by exploring the e¤ects of product
di¤erentiation on the above outcomes. By doing so, we reach a broader set of results, as com-
pared with the respective in the above papers. More specically, our analysis extends Jansen
et al. (2009) in two ways. First, in our context, rmsowners compensate their managers
with Relative Performance contracts, not only if products are perfect substitutes (as in Jansen
et al., 2009) but also whenever products are either su¢ ciently di¤erentiated or su¢ ciently
close substitutes. For intermediate degrees of substitutability, we nd that owners use Market
Share contracts. Second, Jansen et al. (2009) nd that if an owner compensates his manager
with a Relative Performance contract while the rival owner uses either a Prots-Revenues or
a Market Share contract, the former (latter) owner gains the Stackelberg leaders (followers)
prots. We nd that this holds only in the polar case of perfect substitute goods while, for the
remaining spectrum of product substitutability, the leader-follower prot di¤erential decreases
as products become more di¤erentiated. Comparing social welfare across all the di¤erent con-
gurations of contracts, we also extend van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), who compare welfare
only under symmetric prots-sales contracts and symmetric relative performance contracts
with the respective under No-delegation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section
3, we study the equilibrium managerial incentive contracts with ownerscommitment and in
Section 4, we carry out the respective analysis under no-commitment. Section 5 includes the
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welfare analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our model builds upon Jansen et al. (2009) framework, with one important departure. We
assume that the two competing rms produce di¤erentiated instead of homogeneous products.
In particular, we assume that each rm i faces the following (inverse) demand function:
Pi = 1  qi   qj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; 0 <   1 (1)
where pi and qi are, respectively, the price and quantity of rm is product, qi is the quantity
of its rivals product, and  is the degree of product substitutability. Namely, higher  implies
higher product substitutability, i.e., lower product di¤erentiation, that in turn implies smaller
market size.
We further assume that rms have equally e¢ cient production technologies, reected in
constant marginal production costs, i.e. ci = cj = c < 1. Thus, rm is prots are given by:
i = (1  qi   qj   c) qi (2)
In this industry, each rm has an owner and a manager. Following Fershtman and Judd
(1987), owner, is a decision maker whose objective is to maximize the prots of the rm.
This could be the actual owner, a board of directors, or a chief executive o¢ cer. Manager
refers to an agent that the owner hires to make real time operating decisions.
Each rms owner has the opportunity to compensate his manager by o¤ering to him a
take-it-or-leave-it incentive contract.1 In particular, each owner chooses one among three
di¤erent types of contracts. The rst type is the Prots-Revenues (PR) one. Following Fer-
shtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), under this type of contract, the risk-neutral
manager i is paid at the margin, in proportion to a linear combination of own prots and own
revenues. More formally, rm is manager will be given incentive to maximize:
1 In the strategic delegation literature, it is a regular assumption that rmsowners have all the bargaining
power during negotiations with their managers, i.e., they o¤er to their managers take-it-or-leave-it incentive
contracts (see Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; and Miller and Pazgal, 2001; 2002; 2005,
Jansen et al., 2007; 2009, Ritz, 2008). The only exception is van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), where the owner
and (candidate) manager bargain over the managerial incentive parameter, so as the owner to maximize prots
and the manager to optimize bonus.
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UPRi = a
PR
i i + (1  aPRi )Ri (3)
where i and Ri are rm is prots and revenues respectively.2 aPRi is the managerial incentive
parameter that is chosen optimally by rm is owner so as to maximize his prots. We assume
that aPRi 2 [0; 1]. Observe that if aPRi = 1, manager is behavior coincides with owner is
objective for strict prot-maximization. If aPRi < 1, rm is manager moves away from strict
prot-maximization towards including consideration of sales and thus, he becomes a more
aggressive seller in the market.
The second type of contract is the Relative Performance (RP) one. Following Miller and
Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005), under this type of contract, rm is owner compensates his manager
putting unit weight on own prots and a weight  aRPi on rivals prots. Thus, manager is
utility function takes the form:3
URPi = i   aRPi j (4)
As in Jansen et al. (2007; 2009) we further assume that aRPi 2 [0; 1], i.e., we do not allow
owners to direct their managers towards collusion. If aRPi = 0, manager is behavior coincides
with owner is objective for strict prot-maximization. As aRPi ! 1, manager i becomes a
more aggressive seller in the market.
The third type of contract is the Market Share (M ) one. As in Jansen et al. (2007; 2009)
and Ritz (2008), under this type of contract, rm is owner compensates his manager with
a contract constituted by a linear combination of own prots and own market share. In this
case, manager is utility function takes the form:
UMi = i + a
M
i
qi
qi + qj
(5)
with aMi being the respective managerial incentive parameter optimally chosen by owner i
in order to maximize his prots.
2Following Fershtman and Judd (1987), UPRi will not be the managers reward in general. Since the managers
reward is linear in prots and sales, he is paid Ai +BiUPRi for some constants Ai, Bi, with Bi > 0. Since he is
risk-neutral, he acts so as to maximize UPRi and the values of Ai and Bi are irrelevant.
3 In Miller and Pazgal (2002), owner i compensates his manager putting weight of (1  aRPi ) on own prots
and a weight aRPi on the di¤erence between own prots and the rival rms prots, implying that U
RP
i =
(1  aRPi )i + aRPi (i  j). This is equivalent to eq. (4).
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In order to examine which types of managerial incentive contracts will rmsowners choose
to compensate their managers, we consider a three-staged game with observable actions: in
the rst stage, each rms owner commits to one among the three di¤erent types of contracts.
Then, in the second stage of the game, given that the types of contracts have become common
knowledge and can not be reset, each owner sets the corresponding managerial incentive para-
meter aDi , D : PR, RP , M . In the third stage of the game, managers compete a là Cournot.
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The equilibrium concept employed is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium managerial incentive contracts under commit-
ment
In this part of the paper we consider that rmsowners commit over the types of contracts
that they choose to compensate their managers. The payo¤s of the di¤erent subgames are
presented in the following Payo¤ Matrix.
The representation of the game in the strategic form
OWNER 2
PR RP M
PR pr1 , 
pr
2 
pr rp
1 , 
pr rp
2 
pr m
1 , 
pr m
2
OWNER 1 RP rp pr1 , 
rp pr
2 
rp
1 , 
rp
2 
rp m
1 , 
rp m
2
M m pr1 , 
m pr
2 
m rp
1 , 
m rp
2 
m
1 , 
m
2
Due to symmetry, the number of candidate equilibria is reduced to six, namely: Symmetric
Prots-Revenues Contracts (pr), Symmetric Relative Performance Contracts (rp), Symmet-
ric Market Share Contracts (m), Coexistence of Relative Performance and Prots-Revenues
4At this point, it is useful to bear in mind two alternative interpretations of the game. According to the
rst one, following Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), an owner hires a manager and directs him
through an appropriate incentive contract. The alternative interpretation is the one presented by Miller and
Pazgal (2002), where, the problem faced by the owner of each rm is to choose the best type of manager among
those that are available, while each manager is committed to behaving in a certain manner by virtue of his
personality type. More specically, in Miller and Pazgal (2002), potential managers take on a continuum of
attitudes toward relative performance which is captured by their type, '. However, the di¤erence between
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Miller and Pazgal (2002) is only semantic, since owners have all the bargaining
power (by assumption) when setting the contracts.
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Contracts (rp-pr), Coexistence of Relative Performance and Market Share Contracts (rp-m),
Coexistence of Market Share and Prots-Revenues Contracts (m-pr).5 ;6
Let us begin our analysis by investigating the e¤ects of the di¤erent contract types on
managersbehavior in the output competition stage of the game. The reaction curve of a PR-
compensated manager is given by qPRi (qj) =
1
2(1  qj   aPRi c). This implies that manager i
considers aPRi c as the marginal cost of production. For a
PR
i 2 (0; 1], this marginal cost is lower
than that considered by the owner himself in the benchmark case of No-delegation. Thus,
the lower the managerial incentive parameter set by owner i, the higher the aggressiveness
of his manager and the higher the output level that the latter sets. Note also that the slope
of manager is reaction curve is dq
PR
i
dqj
=  2 . Hence, as  ! 1 and products become closer
substitutes, manager is best response to manager j decreases. Moreover, dq
PR
i
dqj
=
dqCi
dqj
suggests
that the PR-compensated managers reaction curve is an outward and parallel shift of the
respective curve in the benchmark case of No-delegation.
Regarding an RP-compensated manager, his reaction curve in the last stage of the game is
given by qRPi (qj) =
1
2

1  c    1  aRPi  qj, implying that manager i considers   1  aRPi  qj
as the rival managers best response. Since aRPi 2 [0; 1],  
 
1  aRPi

qj   qCj suggests
that the rivals best response that an RP-compensated manager anticipates is lower than that
anticipated by an owner in case of No-delegation. An immediate consequence is that an RP-
compensated manager sets output at a level higher than that set by an owner. Regarding
the slope of manager is reaction curve, it is given by dq
RP
i
dqj
=  12
 
1  aRPi

, suggesting that
as  ! 1 and products become closer substitutes, manager is best response to manager j
decreases. Diagrammatically, the managers reaction curve is the benchmarks one rotated
through the intercept.
Finally, the reaction curve for an M-compensated manager is given by #U
M
i
dqMi
= 1   c  
2qMi   qj + a
M
i qj
(qMi +qj)
2 = 0. This reaction curve is a third-degree, di¤erentiable and concave
function. Diagrammatically, this reaction curve is (slightly) hill-shaped and after a relatively
5The rst four candidate equilibria (pr, rp, m, rp-pr ) were solved analytically for obtaining managerial
incentive parameters, quantities and prots. See Appendix A1-A4. The respective results for the last two
candidate equilibria (rp-m, m-pr ) were obtained through numerical simulations. See Appendix A5-A6. Further
details are available from the authors upon request.
6As a benchmark, we consider the No-delegationcase where production decisions are taken by rmsowners.
In this case, the reaction function in the output competition stage is qci (q
c
j ) = (A  c  qcj )=2 while equilibrium
output, prots and total welfare are qci = (A   c)=(2 + ), ci = (qci )2 and TW c = (3 + )(A   c)2=(2 + )2
respectively.
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short interval, it turns negatively sloped (Jansen et al., 2007).
Let us now investigate the impact of product di¤erentiation on output levels and prots un-
der the di¤erent candidate equilibrium congurations of contracts. The following Proposition
summarizes:
Proposition 1 (i) When both owners compensate their managers either with Prots-Revenues
or with Relative Performance contracts, rm is output level and prots decrease in .
(ii) When both owners compensate their managers with Market Share contracts, rm is
output level (prots) increases (decrease) in .
(iii) In the asymmetric congurations of contracts (rp-pr, rp-m, m-pr), rm is output level
and prots have a U-shaped relation in , with the minimum attained around  = 0:8, and
rm js output and prots decrease in .
According to the rst part of Proposition 1, the intuition goes as follows. Recall that the
higher the degree of product di¤erentiation (lower ), the higher the size of the market and
the respective market segment that corresponds to each rm. As  increases, the brands sold
become closer substitutes and as a result, the size of the market and the segment that each
rm exploits decrease. Hence, as  ! 1, this negative product di¤erentiation e¤ect becomes
more severe and the output level set by manager i decreases too. An immediate consequence
is that rm is prots also decrease in .
In the symmetric conguration of M contracts, the degree of product substitutability has
a twofold impact on output levels. On the one hand, as  ! 1 the aforementioned negative
product di¤erentiation e¤ect tends to decrease the output level set by each manager. On the
other hand, as  increases and products become closer substitutes, competition among man-
agers for gaining higher market share becomes ercer. Hence, each manager tends to increase
output. The latter positive competition e¤ect dominates the negative product di¤erentiation
e¤ect and thus, as  ! 1 the output level set by manager i increases. In turn, this overpro-
duction tends to increase revenues and prots but it decreases prices that subsequently tend
to decrease prots. This latter negative price e¤ect dominates the positive output e¤ect and
rm is prots decrease in .
Regarding the asymmetric congurations of contracts, the intuition behind our result goes
as follows. Note rst that qrp pri > q
rp pr
j , q
rp m
i > q
rp m
j and q
m pr
i > q
m pr
j always hold.
The respective inequalities for prots hold too. These inequalities underline the relative com-
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petitive advantage (in terms output expansion and prots) between managers compensated
with di¤erent types of contracts. Hence, Proposition 1(iii) suggests that the output level set
by manager i, who exploits the relative competitive advantage against his rival, has a U-shaped
relation in  with the minimum attained around  = 0:8. Intuitively, for su¢ ciently di¤er-
entiated products (low ), the output level set by both managers decreases in  because of
the negative product di¤erentiation e¤ect. But, as  increases and products become closer
substitutes, manager i increases the output level in order to exploit the competitive advantage
that his contract gives him. Clearly, rmsprots follow the same pattern as the output levels
in each conguration of contracts.
Let us now compare the equilibrium output levels under the di¤erent congurations of con-
tracts, in order to capture their relative competitiveness. The following Corollary summarizes
our ndings:
Corollary 1 (i) qpri > q
rp
i > q
c
i .
(ii) qmi > q
c
i , if and only if  > 0:666.
(iii) qpri > q
m
i .
(iv) qmi > q
rp
i , if and only if  > 0:881.
(v) In each asymmetric conguration of contracts (rp-pr, rp-m, m-pr), each rms
output level lies between the respective levels in the symmetric congurations.
The following observations are in order. First, the symmetric use of either PR or RP man-
agerial incentive contracts increases output, as compared to the benchmark of No-delegation.
The intuition goes as follows. Owner i, by compensating his manager with an incentive con-
tract directs him to a more aggressive behavior in order to force the rival manager to reduce
output. Because each owner acts in the same way at the games contract stage, rms end up in
an overproduction situation.7 Note also that this overproduction increases as products become
closer substitutes (higher ) and competition becomes ercer, i.e. d(q
pr
i  qci )
d > 0,
d(qrpi  qci )
d > 0
and d(q
pr
i  qrpi )
d > 0. Second, the symmetric use of M contracts results in overproduction, as
compared to the benchmark of No-delegation, but only if products are su¢ ciently homoge-
neous, i.e.  > 0:666, and competition among managers for gaining market share is too erce.
Third, regarding the relative severity of the overproduction situation, we nd that it is the
7These ndings are in the spirit of the well-known result in the industrial organization literature, according
to which, rms competing in quantities have no incentive to engage in Stackelberg warfare.
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most erce in case of PR contracts, while it is more intense under M contracts rather than un-
der RP contracts whenever products are highly substitutable, i.e.  > 0:881, and competition
is too erce.
We now turn to the rst stage of the game and investigate the types of contracts that
owners will choose to compensate their managers. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 2 When rms owners commit over the types of contracts that they choose to
compensate their managers:
(i) When products are either su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (  0:242) or su¢ ciently close sub-
stitutes (  0:881), owners compensate their managers with Relative Performance contracts.
(ii) For intermediate degrees of product substitutability (0:243 <  < 0:881), owners com-
pensate their managers with Market Share contracts.
The intuition behind these results goes as follows: When  < 0:881, it holds that qrpi > q
m
i
(Corollary 1(iv)), which in turn implies that prpi < p
m
i . This quantity (price) e¤ect suggests
that prots under RP-compensated managers tend to be higher (lower) than the respective
under M-compensated managers. It proves that for su¢ ciently di¤erentiated products, i.e.
  0:242, the quantity e¤ect on prots is stronger under RP contracts, rather than under
M contracts. Hence, owners compensate their managers with RP contracts. For intermediate
degrees of product substitutability, i.e. 0:243 <  < 0:881, it is the price e¤ect that is stronger
under RP contracts, rather than under M contracts, and owners choose to compensate their
managers with M contracts.
When products are su¢ ciently close substitutes, i.e.   0:881, it holds that qmi > qrpi .
In this case, rmsowners realize that compensating their managers with M contracts would
result in a relatively more severe overproduction situation, characterized by relatively higher
output and lower prots, than the respective under RP contracts. In order to avoid this too
erce prisonersoverproduction situation, owners choose to compensate their managers with
RP contracts.
Note also that owners will never choose to compensate their managers with PR contracts.
This happens because these contracts result in the most severe overproduction situation (Corol-
lary 1(i), (iii)). Last, but not least, we nd that for each -area stated above, no owner has
incentives to deviate from the respective symmetric equilibrium conguration of contracts.8
8The detailed proof is available from the authors upon request.
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This suggests that given owner is choice, over the type of contract to compensate his man-
ager, owner js best response is a contract of the same type.
4 Equilibriummanagerial incentive contracts under no-commitment
So far analysis, as well as the bulk of the received literature in the eld of strategic managerial
incentive contracts, is grounded on the assumption that rmsowners commit over the types
of contracts that they choose to compensate their managers. In this part of the paper we
investigate the case where there is no such ex-ante commitment.
We do so by considering a two-staged game with the following timing: in the rst stage, each
rms owner chooses one type of contract to compensate his manager and sets the corresponding
managerial incentive parameter. The crucial, yet (due to the symmetric industry) reasonable
assumption here is that the precise contract (the type of contract and the managerial incentive
parameter) that owner i sets is not observable by the rival owner, before contract-setting is
everywhere completed.9 This implies that each owner can independently shift from one type
of contract to another. In the second stage of the game, managers compete a là Cournot.
Thus, we propose a conguration of contracts, as a candidate equilibrium, and subsequently
check whether or not it survives all possible deviations, at the rst stage. If yes, the proposed
equilibrium is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Let us consider the Symmetric Prots-Revenues Contracts, as a candidate equilibrium.
Figure 1 o¤ers the visualization of this candidate equilibrium (point EPR). Note that in
equilibrium, two conditions must be fullled: rstly, since production decisions are taken by
managers, their reaction curves RCPR1 and RC
PR
2 must be intersected. Secondly, the fact
that rm is owner o¤ers an incentive contract to his manager, as a strategic tool in order
to become the Stackelberg leader against rm j, implies that in equilibrium there must be
tangency between rm is isoprot curve i and manager js reaction curve RCPRj .
Symmetric Prots-Revenues Contracts is an equilibrium conguration only if no owner has
an incentive to unilaterally deviate, in the rst stage of the game, by o¤ering to his manager
9A crucial assumption of the relevant literature is that delegation is observable. Katz (1991) argues that
unobservable contracts have no commitment value at all. Fershtman and Judd (1987) support that even if
contracts are not observable, they will become common knowledge when the game is being repeated for several
periods. More recently, Kockesen and Ok (2004) argue that to the extent that renegotiation is costly and/or
limited, in a general class of economic settings, strategic aspects of delegation may play an important role in
contract design, even if the contracts are completely unobservable.
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either an RP or an M contract. Of course, such a deviation has to be protable for the owner.
Suppose, for instance, that owner 2 sticks to the PR contract, believing that owner 1 will
compensate his manager with the same type of contract. Thus, in the rst stage of the game
owner 2 sets apr2 =
2 2c(2+)
c(2 2 4) . Consider now that owner 1 deviates towards compensating
his manager with an RP contract. In this case, owner 1 uses his stage 1 reaction function
arp pr1 (a
pr
2 ) to optimally adjust a1 for his managers contract.
10 Thus, in the rst stage of
the game owner 1 sets apr1d =
2 2c(2+)
c(2 2 4) . Observe that a
pr
2 = a
rp pr
1d . Interestingly enough,
the deviant owner 1s prots will be pr1d = 
pr
1 , implying that the magnitude of owner 1s
incentive to deviate from the Symmetric Prots-Revenues conguration towards compensating
his manager with an RP contract, is zero.
q1
RPRC 1
RPRC 2
PRRC 1
PRRC 2
EPR FIRM 1’S
ISOPROFIT CURVE
FIRM 2’S
ISOPROFIT CURVE
*
1
RPRC
Π1
Π2
.ERP .
q2
Figure 1: Equilibrium managerial incentive contracts under no-commitment
Diagrammatically, when owner 1 deviates from the Symmetric Prots-Revenues congura-
tion towards compensating his manager with an RP contract, owner 1 directs his manager to
the reaction curve RCRP1 and, by readjusting the managerial incentive parameter, optimally
readjusts its slope until RCRP

1 . However, the manager of the deviant owner sets output at
10arp pr1 (a2) =
[ 2+c(2 a2)]
(+2) 4 c[2+a2(2 4)]
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a level equal to the one he would set is the Symmetric Prots-Revenues Contracts candidate
equilibrium. Intuitively, this is the unique output level that fullls the equilibrium conditions
stated above. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 3 When rmsowners do not commit over the types of contracts that they choose
to compensate their managers, each type of contract is owner is best response to owner js
choice.
Observe that the two-staged game is characterized by multiplicity of equilibria. Subse-
quently, the following question arises: which types of the managerial incentive contracts will
nally emerge in equilibrium? Using the equilibrium results of Section 4 and employing focal
point analysis, we reinforce our arguments stated in Proposition 2.
Note also that the aforementioned equilibrium conditions must hold for all the di¤erent
types of contracts that owners can o¤er to their managers, regardless the functional forms of
cost and demand and the mode of competition, i.e. Cournot or Bertrand. Thus, assuming no
ex-ante commitment over the types of contracts that owners will o¤er to their managers, even
a contract of di¤erent type could be an owners best response to the rival owners choice.
5 Welfare analysis
In this Section we perform a welfare analysis. Social welfare is dened as the sum of consumers
surplus and rmsprots:
SWw = CSw +w; w = pr; rp;m; rp  pr; rp m;m  pr (6)
CSw =
1 + 
4
(Qw)2
where Qw and w is the total industry output and prots respectively.11
Regarding the symmetric congurations of contracts, one can easily check that SWw >
SW c, w = pr; rp;m, except if managers are compensated with M contracts and  < 0:666.
11Substituting the relevant expressions into eq. (6), we obtain social welfare in the six contract congurations
under consideration. More specically, social welfare for the rst four congurations of contracts is given
in Appendix B. Regarding the last two congurations, social welfare was obtained numerically, through the
simulationsresults, concerning output, presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Further details are available
from the authors upon request.
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The intuition is straightforward. When both managers are compensated either with PR or with
RP contracts, consumerssurplus is higher and rmsprots are lower than the respective in
the benchmark case of No-delegation. Nevertheless, the negative rmsprots e¤ect is always
dominated by the positive consumerssurplus e¤ect. As a consequence, the symmetric use of
either PR or RP contracts is always preferable from the social welfare point of view. When both
managers are compensated with M contracts, consumerssurplus is higher than the respective
in the benchmark, if and only if  > 0:666. On the contrary, rmsprots are higher but only
for intermediate degrees of product substitutability, i.e. 0:253 <  < 0:666. We reconrm in
this case too that the welfare e¤ects of the symmetric use of M contracts are driven by the
consumerssurplus e¤ect.
Clearly, social welfare in each conguration of contracts follows the pattern that output
levels follow. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 4 (i) SW pr > SW rp > SW c.
(ii) SWm > SW c, if and only if  > 0:666.
(iii) SW pr > SWm.
(iv) SWm > SW rp, if and only if  > 0:881.
(v) In each asymmetric conguration of contracts (rp-pr, rp-m, m-pr), social welfare lies
between the respective levels in the symmetric congurations.
The above Proposition replicates our ndings, regarding the comparison of the equilibrium
output levels under the di¤erent congurations of contracts (see Corollary 1). An immediate
consequence is that social welfare in the asymmetric congurations lies between the respective
levels in the symmetric congurations (Proposition 4 (v)). We also nd that social welfare
decreases as products become closer substitutes. This happens because of the negative product
di¤erentiation e¤ect that decreases rms prots always; and consumers surplus, except if
managers are compensated with M contracts and  < 0:666.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by the variety in the CEO compensation practices, the present paper contributes to
the relevant literature, by investigating the impact of product substitutability on the types of
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contracts that rmsowners choose to compensate their managers, as well as on the resulting
market and societal outcomes.
We have identied the di¤erential e¤ects of product substitutability on the output levels
set by managers and the resulting rmsprots, depending on the conguration of contracts
in the industry. Our analysis also suggests that the types of contracts that owners choose to
compensate their managers depend crucially on the degree of product substitutability. When
owners do not commit over the types of contracts, each type of contract can be an owners
best response to the rival owners choice. Finally, managerial incentive contracts are welfare
enhancing but only when they increase consumerssurplus.
Our results have been derived in the context of a duopolistic market where rival rms,
with equally e¢ cient production technologies, produce di¤erentiated products under a linear
demand system. We are of the opinion that a duopolistic market reveals all the essential
di¤erences between the di¤erent types of contracts. This argument could also be supported by
the similarity of ndings between a two- and a three-rm industry, in Jansen et al. (2009). We
are also aware of the limitations of our analysis, assuming specic functional forms. However,
the equilibrium conditions that drive our results allow us to argue that these results will also
hold under general demand and cost functions. The use of more general forms would jeopardize
the clarity of our ndings, without signicantly changing their qualitative character.
Appendix
Appendix A: Equilibrium outcomes for the di¤erent congurations of contracts
A1: Symmetric Prots-Revenues Contracts
apri =
2   2c (2 + )
c (2   2   4) ; q
pr
i =
2(1  c)
4 + 2   2 ; 
pr
i =
2
 
2  2 (1  c)2
(2   2   4)2
A2: Symmetric Relative Performance Contracts
arpi =

2 + 
; qrpi =
(2 + ) (1  c)
4 (1 + )
; rpi =
 
4  2 (1  c)2
16 (1 + )
A3: Symmetric Market Share Contracts
16
ami =
h
2
p
B   17

+ 

7
p
B + 19

+ 
p
B +  + 10
i
(1  c)2
2 (6 + )2
B = 1 + ( + 6)
qmi =
p
B +  + 7

(1  c)
4 (6 + )
mi =
p
B +  + 7
 h
17 pB   
p
B +  + 4
i
(1  c)2
16 (6 + )2
A4: Coexistence of Relative Performance and Prots-Revenues Contracts
arp pr1 =
 [ (2 + )  4]
 [ (2 + ) + 4]  8; a
rp pr
2 =
2 (   1)  c 2 (2 + )  4
c (32   4)
qrp pr1 =
[ (2 + )  4] (1  c)
62   8 ; q
rp pr
2 =
[ [ (2 + )  4]  8] (1  c)
4 (32   4)
rp pr1 =
 
2  2 [ (2 + )  4]2 (1  c)2
8 (4  32)2 ; 
rp pr
2 =
[ [ (2 + )  4]  8] (2  ) (1  c)2
482   64
17
A5: Coexistence of Relative Performance and Market Share Contracts
Table 1 summarizes the simulation results concerning output for this contract conguration.
qrp m1 q
rp m
2 q
rp m
1 q
rp m
2
c  = 0:1  = 0:6
0:2 .38186 .38181 .33197 .32081
0:4 .28639 .28636 .24897 .24061
0:6 .19093 .19090 .16598 .16040
0:8 .09546 .09545 .08299 .08020
c  = 0:2  = 0:7
0:2 .36697 .36660 .32941 .30941
0:4 .27523 .27495 .24706 .23205
0:6 .18348 .18330 .16470 .15470
0:8 .09174 .09165 .08235 .07735
c  = 0:3  = 0:8
0:2 .35480 .35355 .33137 .29490
0:4 .26610 .26516 .24853 .22117
0:6 .17740 .17678 .16568 .14745
0:8 .08870 .08838 .08284 .07372
c  = 0:4  = 0:9
0:2 .34497 .34200 .34385 .27053
0:4 .25873 .25650 .25788 .20289
0:6 .17248 .17100 .17192 .13526
0:8 .08624 .08550 .08596 .06763
c  = 0:5  = 1
0:2 .33711 .33144 .4 .20
0:4 .25283 .24858 .3 .15
0:6 .16855 .16572 .2 .10
0:8 .08427 .08286 .1 .05
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A6: Coexistence of Market Share and Prots-Revenues Contracts
Table 2 summarizes the simulation results concerning output for this contract conguration.
qm pr1 q
m pr
2 q
m pr
1 q
m pr
2
c  = 0:1  = 0:6
0:2 .38186 .38185 .33159 .32749
0:4 .286396 .286394 .24869 .24562
0:6 .19093 .19092 .16579 .16374
0:8 .096465 .096464 .08289 .08187
c  = 0:2  = 0:7
0:2 .36697 .36693 .32829 .31978
0:4 .27523 .27520 .24621 .23983
0:6 .18348 .18346 .16414 .15989
0:8 .09174 .09173 .08207 .07994
c  = 0:3  = 0:8
0:2 .35479 .35458 .32808 .31102
0:4 .26609 .26593 .24606 .23327
0:6 .17739 .17729 .16404 .15551
0:8 .08869 .08864 .08202 .07775
c  = 0:4  = 0:9
0:2 .34494 .34424 .33310 .29855
0:4 .25871 .25818 .24982 .22391
0:6 .17247 .17212 .16655 .14927
0:8 .08623 .08606 .08327 .07463
c  = 0:5  = 1
0:2 .33722 .33540 .35075 .27386
0:4 .25291 .25155 .26303 .20539
0:6 .16861 .16770 .17537 .13693
0:8 .08430 .08385 .08786 .06846
19
Appendix B: Total Welfare
TWPR =
4 [3   (   1)] (A  c)2
[ (   2)  4]2
TWRP =
(2 + ) (6  ) (1  c)2
16 ( + 1)
TWM =

7 +  +
p
B
 h
41 pB   

 +
p
B
i
(1  c)2
16( + 6)2
; B = 1 + ( + 6)
TW (rp pr) =
[768 +  [ 512 +  [ 704 +  [352 +  (   8) [ (   3)  16]]]]] (1  c)2
64 (4  32)2
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